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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78A~4-103(2)(j), as the Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the
Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in refusing to enforce the

settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement") between Appellants Hidden Lake
Homeowners Association, Barbara Wise, Earthwork Property Management Co., and
Barbara Wilson (collectively, "Appellants") and Appellee Annabelle Stone ("Stone"),
and in refusing to award Appellants attorney fees incurred in enforcing the Settlement
Agreement?
This Court reviews a refusal to enforce a settlement agreement for abuse of
discretion. See T.K v. R.C. (In re E.H.), 2004 UT App 419,111, 103 P.3d 177. The
Court reviews the district court's conclusions of law de novo. See Duke v. Graham, 2007
UT 31, ^f 12, 158 P.3d 540. It reviews findings of fact for clear error. See Parduhn v.
Bennett, 2005 UT 22, f 24, 112 P.3d 495.
This issue was preserved in Appellants' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement.
(R. at 525-593.)
2.

In the event that Appellants prevail on appeal, are they entitled to an award

of attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal?

1
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of this appeal or of central importance to the appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature, Course, and Disposition of Proceedings
On December 17, 2010, Stone filed a document in the Third Judicial District Court
styled "Verified Petition for Wrongful Lien Injunction and Damages" (the "Petition")
against Appellants. (R. at 1-14.) Following oral argument on March 1, 2011, the district
court dismissed the Petition pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (R. at
113.) Following the district court's dismissal, Stone filed numerous motions, including a
motion pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for relief from the district court's
judgment. (R. at 294-98.) Stone's son, Todd Stone, also had previously sought leave to
intervene in the lawsuit. (R. at 67-70.) Perceiving further litigation despite dismissal,
Appellants initiated settlement discussions that culminated, on August 9, 2011, in the
Settlement Agreement. (R. at 595.)
Upon Stone's breach of the Settlement Agreement, on August 24, 2011,
Appellants Filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement (the "Motion"). (R. 52526.) Stone did not timely oppose the Motion. (R. at 693-94.) On October 20, 2011, the
district court issued a Memorandum Disposition (the "Memorandum Disposition")
denying the Motion. (R. at 762-65.) In the Memorandum Disposition, the district court
also denied Stone's Rule 60(b) motion. (R. at 762-65.) On November 2, 2011, the
2
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district court entered judgment memorializing and finalizing the rulings contained in the
Memorandum Disposition, including the district court's denial of the Motion. (R. at 79498.)
Stone appealed the district court's dismissal of the Petition—more specifically, the
district court's denial of Stone's Rule 60(b) motion. (R. at 799-800.) Appellants crossappealed the district court's denial of the Motion. (R. at 801-03.) In a per curiam
decision entered April 4, 2012, this Court affirmed the district court's denial of Stone's
Rule 60(b) motion. (R. at 854-57.) See Stone v. Hidden Lakes Condo Association, 2012
UT App 85, f 5, 275 P.3d 283 (per curiam). The Court further stated as follows:
A ruling on the issues presented in [Appellants'] cross-appeal is
deferred pending plenary presentation and consideration of the appeal.
Hereafter, Hidden Lakes Condo Association, Barbara Wise, Barbara
Wilson . . . and Earthwork Property Management are designated as the
Appellants for the remaining portions and briefing of this appeal.
Appellants should note that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider issues
arising from the May 17, 2011 final order as the filing of a rule 60(b)
motion does not toll the time to appeal issues from the underlying
judgment. . . . Thus, this appeal is limited to the review of the district
court's November 2, 2011 order, which denied the rule 60(b) motion as
well as Appellants' motion to enforce the settlement agreement.
(R. at 857.) See id. 1J5n.l.
Statement of Facts
Following the district court's grant of Appellants' motion to dismiss the Petition,
on June 17, 2011, Appellants' counsel, Ryan B. Braithwaite ("Braithwaite"), sent a letter
to Stone's then-counsel, David E. Ross II ("Ross"), proposing settlement. (R. at 595,
602.) At that time, Ross was Stone's formal counsel of record, having filed, only ten
3
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days prior, a Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. (R. at 496-98.)
Among other things, the letter proposed the following: (1) release of the lien in question;
(2) payment of $17 to Stone; (3) dismissal of the pending district court action and appeal;
(4) broad language whereby Stone released Appellants from all claims; and (5) agreement
upon a formalized settlement agreement. (R. at 595-96, 602-03.)
On June 18, 2011, at 11:24 a.m., Ross sent Braithwaite an email stating, "See
proposed release and settlement agreement. Let me know if this meets with your
approval and I will obtain the signatures of my Client." (R. at 596, 605.) Ross's email
contained, as an attachment, a draft "Settlement Agreement and Release." (R. at 596,
608-11.) Later on June 18, 2011, at 11:35 a.m., Ross sent Braithwaite a second email
conveying a proposed stipulation and order dismissing the pending state court action. (R.
at 596-97, 615-16.) Ross further offered to prepare dismissal documents aimed at
dismissing the pending appeal. (R. at 613.)
On June 22, 2011, Braithwaite responded to Ross's emails by attaching copies of
the proposed settlement agreement and dismissal documents with proposed revisions. (R.
at 597, 618, 620-24.) On June 27, 2011, Ross emailed Braithwaite, stating, "The
proposed changes were sent to the Stone's [sic] and waiting for response." (R. at 597,
626.)
On July 22, 2011, Ross sent an email to Braithwaite stating as follows:
Mrs. Stone ok, delay is waiting on definitive response from son, Todd—last
discussion I had with him was that he was not settling. I propose we
proceed with the settlement and release with Mrs. Stone along with
dismissal of the suit, her appeal and lien release. At such point I believe
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 4
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that Todd Stone would have not standing—assuming that he has any to
begin with—I do not see where the Court allowed him to intervene.
(R. at 597, 628.) In response, on July 29, 2011, Braithwaite wrote to Ross as follows:
My clients would obviously prefer to have a global settlement involving
Todd Stone. However, in light of the facts that he wasn't allowed to
intervene, his appeal has been dismissed, and he isn't even an owner of a
unit within the condo association, we're content to proceed with the
settlement with Mrs. Stone only.
To that end, I have re-attached a copy of the settlement agreement I
previously sent to you (and which I understand from your 7/22 email that
Mrs. Stone has approved) and another version of the settlement that deletes
the references to Todd Stone. If he is now willing to participate in the
settlement, then we'd prefer to proceed that way and use the settlement
agreement to which he is a party. However, if he's not willing to
participate, then we can use the other attached settlement agreement.
(R. at 598, 630.) The settlement agreement attached to Braithwaite's July 29, 2011,
email, to which Todd Stone is not a party, is the Settlement Agreement. (R. at 598, 63438.) A copy of the Settlement Agreement (which resides at pages 634-38 of the record
on appeal) is included in the Addendum for the Court's convenience.
The Settlement Agreement contains the following language1:
Mutual Release: Upon execution of this Agreement, each of the parties,
including and without limitation their respective directors, officers,
partners, principals, employees, agents, trustees, attorneys, predecessors
and successors, insurers, parents, subsidiaries and affiliates, divisions,
assigns, representatives, heirs, and executors and administrators, do hereby
acknowledge full and complete satisfaction of, and do hereby fully and
finally settle, release, and discharge each other individually and collectively
from any and all claims, demands, rights, liabilities, contractual obligations,
grievances, charges, attorneys' fees, and causes of action of any nature
under any laws of any jurisdiction, known or unknown, fixed or contingent,
1

This language omits redline changes included in the Settlement Agreement, and sets forth the
language as Stone agreed to it.
5
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patent or latent, anticipated or unanticipated, at law or in equity, including
and without limitation any rights of subrogation, contribution,
indemnification, or apportionment that may exist in law or equity or by
contract, that they or any other person had or has or may have against any
of the others arising from, based upon, relating to, or in connection with the
Lawsuit, or the facts and circumstances surrounding the Lawsuit, or that
were asserted in the Lawsuit or the Appeal, could have been asserted in the
Lawsuit or the Appeal, or exist as of the date of this Agreement.
(R. at 635-36.) It also contains the following language regarding attorney fees and costs:
Attorneys Fees: In the event any suit is brought to enforce any of the
provisions of this Agreement, in addition to any damages which may be
claimed, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in connection with such action.
(R. at 637.)
In response to Braithwaite's July 29, 2012, email, on July 29, Ross emailed
Braithwaite stating, "I am traveling on business this week and partly next week and then
end of week . .. meantime will review your attachments—I read quickly and they look
fine. If any concerns will get back with you otherwise I will send out to Mrs. Stone for
signature." (R. at 598, 640.) Later, on August 9, 2011, Ross sent an email to Braithwaite
stating as follows:
The stipulation and the settlement agreement with your changes comport
with the settlement agreement. I suggest you obtain your clients and
earthwork signatures and you sign and send to me. I will sign and obtain
the signature of Mrs. Stone—then send the Stipulation to you along with a
conforming proposed order that you can sign the "Approved as to Form"
part and provide you with an original fully executed settlement agreement.
You can then file the Stip and proposed order with court and mail me a
copy of the proposed order after you have signed approved as to form.
I sent a copy of the proposed stipulation and settlement agreement to Mrs.
Stone indicating that this was the offer she made to you through me and
you accepted.
6
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(R. at 598-99, 645.)
Stone subsequently failed and refused to honor the terms of the Settlement
Agreement. (R. at 599.) On August 18, 2011, Ross filed a motion to withdraw as
Stone's counsel. (R. at 522-24.) On September 6, 2011, the district court granted that
motion. (R. at 646.)
On August 24, 2011, Appellants filed the Motion. (R. at 525-26.) Stone did not
timely oppose the Motion. On or about September 20, 2011, Stone filed a document, in
more or less the form of an affidavit, styled "Annabelle Stone's Notice she has NEVER
Authorized or Engaged in any 'alleged' Settlement Agreement Respondent seeks
enforce" (the "Notice"). (R. at 693-94.) In that document, Stone generally denied
agreeing to the Settlement Agreement. (R. at 693.) In a separate document styled
"Notice of Respondent's Misrepresentation of fact Subject to Perjury Charges related to
Amounts Alleged to be Due or Attorney Fees," also filed on or about September 20,
2011, Stone cursorily referenced her Notice and further denied agreeing to the Settlement
Agreement. (R. at 696.) That was the sum total of Stone's opposition to the Motion.
On October 20, 2011, the Court issued the Memorandum Disposition, which stated
as follows regarding the Motion:
After reviewing the record in this matter and although Petitioner's
Opposition was untimely and not in compliance with the applicable Rules,
given her contention that a Settlement Agreement was not reached in this
case, Respondents' Motion is denied.

7
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(R. at 764.) A copy of the Memorandum Disposition is included in the Addendum for the
Court's convenience.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court abused its discretion by denying the Motion, declining to enforce
the Settlement Agreement, and declining to award fees to Appellants. The facts in the
record indicate, without question, a binding settlement agreement between Stone and
Appellants. Ross was Stone's attorney of record during the course of settlement
negotiations, and he conveyed Stone's agreement to the terms of the Settlement
Agreement—a specific document with concrete, definable terms. It is well established in
Utah that courts may summarily enforce even oral settlement agreements, and Stone's
attorney possessed apparent authority to bind her to the Settlement Agreement.
Stone's opposition to the Motion consisted of nothing more than a self-serving
affidavit that did not address the reality that her attorney had, in fact, already bound her to
the Settlement Agreement, whether or not she even knew it. The district court's decision
was based on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law and therefore constitutes an
abuse of discretion.
The district court abused its discretion by denying the Motion and declining to
enforce the Settlement Agreement, and by declining to award Appellants attorney fees
and costs pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. This Court should reverse the district
court's ruling, enforce the Settlement Agreement as it is set forth in the Addendum to this

8
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brief, and remand this issue to the district court for a determination of attorney fees and
costs to be awarded to Appellants.
Finally, this Court should also award attorney fees and costs on appeal, pursuant to
the Settlement Agreement.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DECLINING TO
ENFORCE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND BY DECLINING TO
AWARD ATTORNEY FEES.2
A.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Declining to Enforce the
Settlement Agreement.

As noted above, the district court denied Appellants' motion in a one-sentence
ruling:
After reviewing the record in this matter and although Petitioner's
Opposition was untimely and not in compliance with the applicable Rules,
given her contention that a Settlement Agreement was not reached in this
case, Respondents' Motion is denied.
(R. at 764.) In so ruling, the district court abused its discretion.
"It is a basic rule that the law favors the settlement of disputes." Mascaro v.

2

Although not, strictly speaking, relevant to the issues of the appeal, it is worth noting that for
Appellants, this is not just an appeal of a $17 settlement agreement. The Court may take judicial
notice of the fact that its dockets are littered with appeals filed by Stone out of this single district
court action. To date, she has filed no fewer than seven. See the dockets for Cases Nos.
20110990-CA, 20110992-CA, 20120046-CA, 20120361-CA, 20120423-CA, 20110383-CA, and
20110452-CA. The Court may also note Stone's numerous, repetitive, and meritless filings in
the district court, particularly after the district court dismissed her single claim. As the parties
that have to defend themselves against Stone's frequent filings (and, apparently, will continue to
do so into the future), the release language contained in the Settlement Agreement, as well as its
attorney fee provision, is of significant value to Appellants.
9
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Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 942 (Utah 1987). To that end, a "trial court has power to summarily
enforce on motion a settlement agreement entered into by the litigants where all the
litigation is pending before it." See Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 592
P.2d 605, 609 (Utah 1979).
"It is of no legal consequence that the parties have not signed a settlement
agreement." Goodmansen v. Liberty VendingSys., Inc., 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993); see also Murray v. State, 137 P.2d 1000, 1001 (Utah 1987) (noting that
"[t]he fact that plaintiffs had not yet signed a written [settlement] agreement is of no legal
consequence," and that so long as the statute of frauds does not require a written
settlement agreement, oral or unsigned settlement agreements are unenforceable); John
Deere Co. v. A & HEquip., Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (affirming the
enforceability of oral settlement agreements. "Parties have no right to welch on a
settlement deal during the sometimes substantial period between when the deal is struck
and when all necessary signatures can be garnered on a stipulation." Brown v. Brown,
744 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Orme, J., dissenting) (quoted in Goodmansen,
866P.2dat585).
Moreover, a party's counsel may bind the party to a settlement agreement. See
Goodmansen, 866 P.2d at 584-85 (affirming a decision enforcing a settlement agreement
based on correspondence between counsel). Indeed, parties are bound by the acts of their
counsel pursuant to the doctrine of apparent authority. See id. at 584; see also

10
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Luddington v. BodenvestLtd, 855 P.2d 204, 208-09 (Utah 1993) (outlining the
parameters of the doctrine of apparent authority).
Goodmansen, a decision of this Court, is precisely on point. There, counsel
exchanged several letters memorializing the terms of a settlement agreement between
counsel's respective clients. Those letters reflected the parties' agreement to the terms
contained therein. See Goodmans en, 866 P.2d at 583-84. One of the parties declined to
honor the terms set forth in counsel's correspondence, and counsel for that party
withdrew. See id. at 584. Although no settlement agreement or other signed settlement
documents had been executed, the aggrieved party brought a motion to enforce the
settlement agreement based on the letters between counsel. See id. The district court
granted the motion. See id. This Court affirmed, concluding that "the three letters
between [counsel] dated March 22, 1991 constitute a binding agreement between the
parties." See id. at 585. The Court specifically noted the conveyances of offers and
acceptances in the letters on behalf of counsel's respective clients. See id. In
Goodmansen, as here, there was no executed, formalized settlement agreement, and the
offers and acceptances were exchanged between counsel rather than the parties. Still, the
district court and this Court enforced the settlement agreement.
Here, the undisputed record evidence shows that on June 22, 2011, Braithwaite
sent Ross a draft settlement agreement and dismissal documents reflecting revisions that
Braithwaite had made to documents Ross had previously provided. (R. at 597, 618, 62022.) On June 27, 2011, Ross emailed Braithwaite, stating, "The proposed changes were
11
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sent to the Stone's [sic] and waiting for response." (R. at 597, 626.) Later, on July 22,
2011, Ross sent an email to Braithwaite stating as follows:
Mrs. Stone ok, delay is waiting on definitive response from son, Todd—last
discussion I had with him was that he was not settling. / propose we
proceed with the settlement and release with Mrs. Stone along with
dismissal of the suit, her appeal and lien release. At such point I believe
that Todd Stone would have not standing—assuming that he has any to
begin with—I do not see where the Court allowed him to intervene.
(Emphasis added.) (R. at 597, 628.) In response, on July 29, 2011, Braithwaite stated as
follows:
My clients would obviously prefer to have a global settlement involving
Todd Stone. However, in light of the facts that he wasn't allowed to
intervene, his appeal has been dismissed, and he isn't even an owner of a
unit within the condo association, we're content to proceed with the
settlement with Mrs. Stone only.
To that end, I have re-attached a copy of the settlement agreement I
previously sent to you (and which I understand from your 7/22 email that
Mrs. Stone has approved) and another version of the settlement that deletes
the references to Todd Stone. If he is now willing to participate in the
settlement, then we'd prefer to proceed that way and use the settlement
agreement to which he is a party. However, if he's not willing to
participate, then we can use the other attached settlement agreement.
(R. at 598, 630.) The Settlement Agreement is the document attached to Braithwaite's
July 29, 2011, email—the version that excluded Todd Stone from its purview. (R. at 598,
634-38.)
In response, on July 29, Ross emailed Braithwaite stating, "I am traveling on
business this week and partly next week and then end of week .. . meantime will review
your attachments—/ read quickly and they look fine. If any concerns will get back with
you otherwise I will send out to Mrs. Stone for signature" (Emphasis added.) (R. at 598,
12
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640.) Subsequently, on August 9, 2011, Ross sent an email to Braithwaite stating as
follows:
The stipulation and the settlement agreement with your changes comport
with the settlement agreement. I suggest you obtain your clients and
earthwork signatures and you sign and send to me. I will sign and obtain
the signature of Mrs. Stone—then send the Stipulation to you along with a
conforming proposed order that you can sign the "Approved as to Form"
part and provide you with an original fully executed settlement agreement.
You can then file the Stip and proposed order with court and mail me a
copy of the proposed order after you have signed approved as to form.
/ sent a copy of the proposed stipulation and settlement agreement to Mrs.
Stone indicating that this was the offer she made to you through me and you
accepted.
(R. at 598-99, 645.) (Emphasis added.)
In this email correspondence, Ross represented twice—once on July 22, 2011, and
again on August 9, 2011—that Stone accepted and agreed to the terms of the Settlement
Agreement (as well as the terms of the prior draft insofar as they pertained to her). He
proceeded to describe a mechanism for obtaining signatures and for orchestrating
dismissal. He explicitly stated that he told Stone that the Settlement Agreement
memorialized the offer she had previously made, through Ross, and that her offer had
been accepted.
When Ross issued those communications, he was Stone's attorney of record—he
did not even file a motion to withdraw as her counsel until after Stone had breached the
Settlement Agreement. (R. at 522-24.) As such, he possessed apparent authority to bind

3

As Braithwaite explained to Ross, the Settlement Agreement differed from the prior draft only
insofar as it omitted Todd Stone.
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Stone. See Goodmansen, 866 P.2d at 584. Indeed, the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct prohibited Braiihvjdite from speaking directly with Stone, a represented party.
See Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 4.2(a). Ross was the only person with whom Braithwaite
could discuss settlement. Stone cannot hire a lawyer, require all communications to go
through him, and then "welch" on her deal by claiming that the attorney did not speak for
her after all.
The Settlement Agreement itself clearly addresses all material terms and is
unambiguous in its provisions. (R. at 634-38.) There can be no doubt that it evidences a
meeting of the minds on all essential terms.
In the face of this mountain of evidence, Stone submitted a sole, conclusory, selfserving affidavit stating simply that she did not agree to the Settlement Agreement. (R. at
693-94.) But even assuming the truth of Stone's statement, pursuant to Goodmansen and
established Utah case law describing the doctrine of apparent authority, it is irrelevant
that she did not personally "agree" to the Settlement Agreement. Her attorney, who was
her agent, possessed of apparent authority, agreed to it on her behalf. See Goodmansen,
866 P.2d at 584-85. Literally, Stone set forth no evidence contradicting Appellants'
argument or the facts upon which it was based. The district court's decision to credit
Stone's conclusory, self-serving testimony above her counsel's prior, undisputed
statements binding her to the Settlement Agreement—the only statements that are legally
significant—is legal error, and the district court abused its discretion by basing its
decision on that error. See Taylor-West Weber Water Improv. Dist. v. Olds, 2009 UT 86,
14
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If 3, 224 P.3d 709 ("The district court abuses its discretion when it relies on an erroneous
conclusion of law to come to its decision.'5).
In fine, the undisputed record evidence before the Court bespeaks a fully
enforceable settlement agreement between Appellants and Stone. Stone agreed to the
Settlement Agreement. This Court should reverse the district court's decision denying
the Motion, and it should enforce the Settlement Agreement. Specifically, but without
limitation, the Court should enforce the following language regarding Stone's release of
Appellants, as well as her agreement to pay attorney fees and costs incurred in enforcing
the Settlement Agreement:
Mutual Release: Upon execution of this Agreement, each of the parties,
including and without limitation their respective directors, officers,
partners, principals, employees, agents, trustees, attorneys, predecessors
and successors, insurers, parents, subsidiaries and affiliates, divisions,
assigns, representatives, heirs, and executors and administrators, do hereby
acknowledge full and complete satisfaction of, and do hereby fully and
finally settle, release, and discharge each other individually and collectively
from any and all claims, demands, rights, liabilities, contractual obligations,
grievances, charges, attorneys' fees, and causes of action of any nature
under any laws of any jurisdiction, known or unknown, fixed or contingent,
patent or latent, anticipated or unanticipated, at law or in equity, including
and without limitation any rights of subrogation, contribution,
indemnification, or apportionment that may exist in law or equity or by
contract, that they or any other person had or has or may have against any
of the others arising from, based upon, relating to, or in connection with the
Lawsuit, or the facts and circumstances surrounding the Lawsuit, or that
were asserted in the Lawsuit or the Appeal, could have been asserted in the
Lawsuit or the Appeal, or exist as of the date of this Agreement.
(R. at 635-36.)
Attorneys Fees: In the event any suit is brought to enforce any of the
provisions of this Agreement, in addition to any damages which may be
claimed, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its costs and
15
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reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in connection with such action.
(R. at 637.)
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion by Declining to Enter an
Award of Attorney Fees and Costs in Appellants' Favor.

The Settlement Agreement contains the following language:
Attorneys Fees. In the event any suit is brought to enforce any of the
provisions of this Agreement, in addition to any damages which may be
claimed, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in connection with such action.
(R. at 637.) When a party successfully enforces a settlement agreement, Utah courts also
enforce the agreement's attorney fee provision. See Goodmansen, 866 P.2d at 586
(affirming district court's enforcement of settlement agreement and attorney fee
provision).
Here, because the district court should have enforced the Settlement Agreement,
and because the Settlement Agreement contains a provision awarding fees and costs to a
prevailing party seeking to enforce the Settlement Agreement, the district court further
abused its discretion by declining to award Appellants their fees and costs incurred in
enforcing the Settlement Agreement. In addition to reversing the district court's decision
declining to enforce the Settlement Agreement, the Court should remand this case to the
district court for a determination of attorney fees and costs owing for litigation before that
court to enforce the Settlement Agreement.
II.

CROSS-APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS INCURRED ON APPEAL,
"If the trial court determines that a party is entitled to an award of attorney fees by
16
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law, the party may also recover its attorney fees on appeal." PP&T, LLC v. Brinar, Case
No. 20070538-CA, 2008 UT App 198, *4 (2008) (unpublished disposition) (citing Coates
v. Am. Economy Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1981)). Utah appellate courts award
attorney fees and costs on appeal where there is a contractual basis for doing so. See
Oakwood Vill LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2005 UT 101, \ 57, 104 P.3d 1226 (affirming an
award of attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to contract).
Here, as explained above, the Settlement Agreement is enforceable, and
Appellants are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with
its enforcement. That enforcement has taken Appellants to this Court. This Court should
therefore award Appellants their attorney fees and costs on appeal, in addition to
remanding to the district court for a determination of attorney fees and costs incurred
there. Appellants reserve the right to submit a declaration of costs and attorney fees upon
the Court's entry of a ruling on the substantive issues in the case.
CONCLUSION
The district court abused its discretion by denying the Motion, declining to enforce
the Settlement Agreement, and declining to award attorney fees and costs. In abusing its
discretion, the district court rested its ruling on a faulty understanding of applicable law.
This Court should correct that mistake: it should reverse the district court's denial of the
Motion, enforce the settlement agreement, and remand to the district court for a
determination of attorney fees and costs incurred there, and with instructions that the

17
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district court award those fees and costs to Appellant. This Court should also award
attorney fees and costs on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of July, 2012
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE

^Kyan B. Braithwaite
Daniel K. Brough
Attorneys for Appellants
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ADDENDUM
1.

Memorandum Decision entered October 20, 2011

2.

Settlement Agreement attached to Braithwaite's July 29, 2011, email to
Ross
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DI§ft?<§^0ff
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE QF_UTAHTUKECOUN1
"tycie*"

ANNABELLE STONE,
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs.
Case No. 100925189
HIDDEN LAKES HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, BARBARA WISE,
EARTHWORK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
CO., and BARBARA WILSON,

Hon. JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR.

Respondents.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
pending motions/filings.

As background, this case came before

the Court for hearing on March 1, 2011. Based upon the evidence
presented at the hearing, the Court, on March 28, 2011, entered
an order granting Respondents' Motion to Dismiss with prejudice.
The Court requested additional briefing in connection with
Respondents' request for an award of attorneys' fees and costs.
On April 14, 2011, the matter again came before the Court for a
hearing regarding Respondents' request for fees.

On May 16,

2011, the Court entered an Order denying the requested fees.
Plaintiff's April 14, 2011 Filed Rule 60b Motion
Turning initially to Plaintiff's April 14, 2011 filed Rule
60b Motion, with this motion, Petitioner seeks relief from the
Court's March 29, 2011 Order granting Respondents' Motion to
Dismiss.

As this Court has already determined, the lien recorded
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

against Petitioner's property is a statutory lien that is
excluded from the purview of the wrongful lien act.

While

Petitioner has reargued her same statutory provisions, such have
been ruled as, and continue to be, inapplicable.

Accordingly,

Plaintiff's April 14, 2011 Filed Rule 60b Motion is, denied.

Petitioner's Motion Related to Plaintiff's Notice of Court's
Misinterpretation of Statutory Lien Law Affording Respondent
Preferential & Unjust Consideration at Plaintiff s Expense and
Petitioner's 2nd Motion Related to Plaintiff's Notice of Court's
Misinterpretation of Statutory Lien Law Affording Respondent
Preferential & Unjust Consideration at Plaintiff's Expense

After reviewing the record in this matter, the Court
concludes these motions are effectively motions for
reconsideration and even if considered, such are untimely and
reiterate information, statements, and arguments that have been
made and ruled upon on several previous occasions.

The

aforementioned motions are denied.
Petitioner's Notice of Respondent's Misrepresentation of Fact
Subject To Perjury Charges Related to Amounts Alleged To Be Due
Or Attorney Fees.

This filing is a re-argument of issues upon which this Court
has already ruled and for which there are not appropriate grounds
to set that ruling aside.

The Court's prior rulings in this case

will remain as the law of the case.
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Respondents' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement
After reviewing the record in this matter and although
Petitioner's Opposition was untimely and not in compliance with
the applicable Rules, given her contention that a Settlement
Agreement was not reached in this case, Respondents' Motion is
denied.
Petitioner's Rule 42 Motion to Consolidate.
With this motion, Petitioner seeks to consolidate four cases
"to accommodate the statutory requirements afforded Joanne Stone
as needing to be given proper notice of any or all court hearings
and rulings affecting her property interests or rights that
respondents have failed to give such proper notice of their
unenforceable lien."
Because the cases do not involve common questions of law or
fact, consolidation of this matter with any other case is not
appropriate under Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Accordingly, Petitioner's Rule 42 Motion to Consolidate is
denied.

/_

.i-4/ 7

DATED this

day of October, 2011
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 100925189 by the method and on the date
specified.
MAIL: ANNABELLE STONE 3747 HILLSIDE LANE SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84109
MAIL: RYAN B BRAITHWAITE 3165 E MILLROCK DR STE 500 SALT LAKE CITY
UT 84121-5039
Date:

ID 2E2
Deputy Court Clerk
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE
The parties to this Settlement Agreement and Release ("Agreement") are
Annabelle Stone, an individual and Plaintiff, and Annabelle Lund Stone as Trustee of the
Annabelle Lund Stone Family Trust u/a/d April 16. 2001 and Todd Stone. Annabelle
Stone's son and an interested party (collectively referred to as "Stone") and Hidden Lake
Homeowner's Association. Hidden Lake Condominium Homeowners Association. Inc.,
Barbara Wise, Barbara Wilson. Earthwork. Earthwork Landscaping. Inc. and Earthwork
Property Management Co., Defendants (collectively referred to as "Hidden Lake") and
have entered into this Agreement this

—day of JmaeAugust 2011.
RECITALS

1. Stone has asserted claims against Hidden Lake in case No. 100925189 in the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City Department, (the
"Lawsuit").
2. The Court dismissed Stone's claim and Stone appealed the dismissal to the Utah
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Utah Court of
Appeals, Appellate Nos. 20110383 and 20110452 (the "Appeal").
3. None of the parties to this Agreement admit any fault or wrongdoing.
4. By this Agreement, the parties fully settle all disputes between them, without
admission of liability or fault, which have been or shcould have been brought in
connection with the above referenced lLawsuit.
5. Hidden Lake on November 18, 2009 recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's
Office a Notice of Claim of Lien (the "Lien") as Entry No. 10841222 against Stone^s
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condominium unit within the Hidden Lake Condominiums for which the subject
ILawsuit ensued seeking its release.

TERMS
In exchange for their mutual promises, the parties to this Agreement agree as
follows:
6. Lien Release: Hidden Lake hereby agrees to immediately cause the release of the
Lien upon receipt by it from Stone of the interest owed that the parties have agreed is
$17.00 and upon receipt of a copy of the Agreement executed by Stone.
7. Mutual Release: Upon execution of this Agreement, each of the parties, including
and without limitation their respective directors, officers, partners, principals,
employees, agents, trustees, attorneys, predecessors and successors, insurers, parents,
subsidiaries and affiliates, divisions, assigns, representatives, heirs, and executors and
administrators, do hereby acknowledge full and complete satisfaction of, and do
hereby fully and finally settle, release, and discharge each other individually and
collectively from any and all claims, demands, rights, liabilities, contractual
obligations, grievances, charges, attorneys' fees, and causes of action of any nature
under any laws of any jurisdiction, known? or unknown, fixed or contingent, patent or
latent, anticipated or unanticipated, at law or in equity, including and without
limitation any rights of subrogation, contribution, indemnification, or apportionment
that may exist in law or equity or by contract, that they or any other person had or has
or may have against any of the others arising from, based upon, relating to, or in
connection with the Lawsuit, or the facts and circumstances surrounding the Lawsuit
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or that were asserted in the Lawsuit or the Appeal could have been asserted in the
Lawsuit or the Appeal or exist as of the date of this Agreement.
8. Dismissal of Litigation: Upon release of the Lien as described above, the parties,
through their respective counsel, shall file a stipulation and order of dismissal with
prejudice of the Lawsuit and Stone shall immediately dismiss the Appeal as described
herein. Each party to the Lawsuit shall bear its costs, expenses and attorneys' fees in
connection with the Lawsuit, the Appeal and in connection with the execution of this
Agreement.
9. No Admission: It is understood and agreed that this Agreement is not an admission
of liability on behalf of any party.
10. No Other Representations: The parties each represent and acknowledge that, in
executing this Agreement, they do not rely and have not relied upon any
representation or statement made by each other (except as set forth in this
Agreement), or by any agents, representative, or attorneys of the others with regard to
the subject matter, basis, or fact of this Agreement.
11. Integration: All understandings and agreements heretofore had or made between the
parties are merged in this Agreement, which alone fully and completely express their
agreement relating to the subject matter hereof. This Agreement shall not be
amended or modified, except in a writing signed by all parties hereto.
12. Approval by Attorneys: The parties each acknowledge that they are entering into this
Agreement having fully reviewed the terms hereof, and the legal effect of their
signing this Agreement, in consultation with their respective legal counsel.
13. Successors and Assigns: This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the
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benefit of the Parties hereto and their respective heirs, successors, and assigns. No
Party to this Agreement may assign their rights or obligations hereunder without the
prior written consent of the other parties hereto.
14. Governing Law: This Agreement shall be governed and construed in accordance with
the laws of the State of Utah.
15. Attorneys Fees: In the event any suit is brought to enforce any of the provisions of
this Agreement, in addition to any damages which may be claimed, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to recover its costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in
connection with such action.
16. Counterparts: This Agreement may be executed in counterparts.
17. Authorization: Each of the persons signing below on behalf of the parties specifically
represents and acknowledges that they have been authorized to do so by the party on
whose behalf they have signed this Settlement Agreement.
Agreed and Accepted:

Annabelle Stone, individually

Date

Annabelle Lund Stone Family Trust u/a/d April 16. 2004
BY
Annabelle Lund Stone, Trustee

;
Date

Hidden Lake Condominium Homeowners Association, Inc.
BY
Barbara Wise, Board Member

Date

Hidden Lake Homeowners Association
BY
Barbara Wise, Board Member

Date
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Barbara Wise, individually

Date

Barbara Wilson, individually

Date

Todd Stone, individually

Date

Earthwork Property Management Co.
BY
Steven Breitling

Date

Earthwork
BY
Steven Breitling

Date

Earthwork Landscaping, Inc.
BY
Steven Breitling

Date

Bennett Tueller Johnson & Deere
BY
Ryan B. Braithwaite
Attorneys for Defendants

David E. Ross II
Attorney for Plaintiff & Todd Stone

Dated

Dated
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